Berjiwa mardika. Berdiri lantang di antara dua raksasa perang dingin.
Pria itu berbicara pada forum terhormat di jantung Amerika yang sibuk, New York, 8 Maret 1960. Panjang lebar dia urai, bagaimana negara-negara yang baru merdeka akan memperoleh manfaat dari dana khusus PBB yang dirancangnya. Forum itu bernama mentereng; Economic Club. Ini organisasi nonpartisan yang suka membahas isu sosial ekonomi dan politik.
Pada tahun itu, dia sudah jadi Sekjen Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa (PBB); Ia telah merancang suatu proyek yang dinamakan OPEX; menempatkan pejabat PBB di negara-negara yang baru merdeka, selama jangka waktu maksimal 6 tahun.
Hammarskjöld sudah menerapkan program itu di Afrika. Pada 1961, ia berencana memasukkan Papua sebagai salah satu negara-negara yang dimaksud sebagai bangsa Papua. Sebuah program yang sangat berani pada masa perang dingin.
Dikutip dari laman resmi PBB (un.org) Hammarskjöld lahir Jonkoping di Swedia, 29 Juli 1905. Ayahnya, Hjalmar Hammarskjöld, adalah Perdana Menteri Swedia selama Perang Dunia I. Pada 1925, ia menyelesaikan studi Linguistik, Sastra dan Sejarah di Universitas Uppsala, Swedia. Ia melanjutkan studinya di universitas hingga menggondol gelar Bachelor of Laws pada 1930.
Tiga tahun berikutnya, 1933, ia meraih gelar doktor dari Universitas Stockholm, dimana ia mengajar dan jadi Asisten Profesor Ekonomi Politik.
Sejak mula, Hammarskjöld menyatakan dirinya sebagai sosok independen. Dia tidak pernah bergabung dengan partai politik mana pun. Dia mengabdi kepada Pemerintah Swedia. Kurun 1941-1948, ia menjabat Ketua Dewan Bank Nasional. Pada 20 Desember 1954, ia jadi anggota Akademi Swedia – badan yang memberikan Hadiah Nobel Sastra, dimana ayahnya juga pernah menjadi anggotanya.
Hammarskjöld lantas ditunjuk sebagai Sekjen PBB oleh Majelis Umum pada 7 April 1953, atas rekomendasi Dewan Keamanan. Dia mendapat suara bulat,karena dianggap paling independen. Dia bahkan terpilih lagi pada jabatan yang sama pada September 1957.
Lewat program OPEX, Hammarskjöld bermaksud menyudahi sengketa Papua secara damai. Orang Papua akan diberi kemerdekaan dengan menyisihkan kepentingan Belanda dan Indonesia, yang bertikai memperebut besar pulau terbesar kedua di dunia setelah Greenland itu.
Saat itu, masih ada 88 wilayah di bawah pemerintahan kolonial yang menunggu jadi negara merdeka. Hammarskjöld telah berhasil membawa separuh dari negara-negara itu menuju kemerdekaan.
Kamerun misalnya, dengan luas lahan yang sama dengan Papua, dulunya berada di bawah pemerintahan Perancis dan Inggris. Pada Maret 1961 rakyat Kamerun melakukan voting di bawah naungan PBB. Mereka yang berasal dari Kamerun Utara memutuskan untuk memperoleh kemerdekaan, bergabung dengan Republik Kamerun.
“Ia akan mengubah PBB menjadi kekuatan dunia yang penting dan menciptakan sebuah bangsa besar untuk menjadi penyeimbang bagi mereka yang terlibat perang dingin,” tulis Greg Poulgrain, Indonesianis dari Universitas Sunshine Coast, Brisbane, Australia pada bukunya yang bikin heboh, “bayang-bayang intervensi; perang siasat John F.Kennedy dan Allen Dulles atas Sukarno” (2018).
Dalam kasus Papua, Hammarskjöld hendak menyatakan tuntutan atas kedaulatan Papua, baik yang diklaim oleh Belanda dan Indonesia adalah tidak sah. Ia mengusulkan untuk membantu rakyat Papua lewat peran PBB.
Hammarskjöld membuat solusi bagi rakyat Papua agar mampu bertahan dari tekanan perang dingin. Sikap Hammarskjöld itu, tentu tidak disenangi blok barat dan timur. Tapi sesuai wataknya, ia tak pernah gentar. Tapi niat baiknya untuk Papua itu dibikin kandas pada Minggu dinihari, 17 November 1961. Pesawat PBB yang membawanya bersama 15 orang lainnya, jatuh ketika hendak mendekati landasan Ndola di Rhodesia (Zambia). Seluruh penumpang dinyatakan tewas. Murni kecelakaan atau konspirasi pembunuhan? (bersambung).
December 1, 2021 will mark the 60th anniversary of the birth of West Papua. It also marks the first anniversary of the formation of the ULMWP Provisional Government.
To my people back home and around the world: this is a very significant and important day for us to remember. When the Morning Star was raised by the New Guinea Council on December 1, 1961, they formed the embryo of the nation.
I call on everyone to celebrate this day through peaceful prayer meetings. To our international solidarity supporters, please use your freedom to show your support for our struggle, wherever you are. Special flag raising ceremonies coordinated by the Provisional Government will take place in PNG, Vanuatu, the Netherlands, and the UK. I also invite Indonesian solidarity and all Indonesian citizens to pray for us and respect our national day, as we have respected your independence day.
On this day we will remember people in the bush, particularly the thousands displaced by Indonesian military operations in Intan Jaya, Nduga, Puncak Jaya, Maybrat and Oksibil. We remember the two year old baby killed at the hands of the Indonesian government last month.
The world must keep an eye on our nation on December 1. There is often bloodshed carried out by Indonesian military and police. We do not want this – we will be celebrating in a peaceful way. There is no need to harass, intimidate or attack those who are peacefully praying. I call on the Indonesian government and President to leave us alone on our national day. Our time is coming, and one day we will stand side-by-side as good neighbours.
We will also be celebrating the announcements and progress we have made in the last two years, with our constitution, Provisional Government, cabinet, and recently our Green State Vision for the nation. The ULMWP Provisional Government has consistently recognised all proclamations made in the history of our struggle by West Papuan leaders before us.
With these important steps we have made, I encourage my people to come together in one spirit to celebrate and move us closer to our goal of independence and self-determination for all. We wish peace on West Papua, on Indonesia, the region and the whole world.
Benny Wenda Interim President ULMWP Provisional Government
Today, November 19th, is the anniversary of the day when the UN “took note” of the Act of free choice, 1969 and allowed the Indonesian colonisation of West Papua. Repost: @kolaliwenda 🌟
From July-August 1969, The Indonesian govt & U.N. officials conducted the so-called “Act of Free Choice.” Despite all adult Papuans having the right to participate in the vote, Indonesian authorities only selected 1,026 West Papuans (0.1% of the population) to vote.
The Indonesian General Ali Moertopo told the selected “delegates”- “This is what will happen to anyone who votes against Indonesia. Their accursed tongues will be torn out. Their full mouths will be wrenched open. Upon them will fall the vengeance of the Indonesian people. I will myself shoot them on the spot.”
UN official Fernando Ortiz Sanz’s final report was presented to the UNGA in November 1969. He expressed concern that the political freedoms guaranteed by the Act had not been fulfilled & that “certain elements” of the population favoured independence. Nonetheless he declared that, “an act of free choice has taken place in West Irian in accordance with Indonesian practice”
➡️ Legal research and analysis has concluded that the Act of free choice was a breach of international law and a fraud committed against the West Papuan people.
Agenda Tunggal United Liberation Movement for West Papua adalah: HAK PENENTUAN NASIB SENDIRI bagi Bangsa Papua. Agenda Penentuan Nasib Sendiri (HPNS) telah diatur secara Internasional berdasarkan Resolusi Perserikatan Bangsa – Bangsa (PBB) Nomor: 1514 – 1541 dan pada Piagam PBB bab XI (Sebelas). Dalam hal ini ULMWP sedang memperjuangkan agenda HPNS melalui dua jalur yaitu jalur Politik dan Jalur Hukum. Pada jalur Politik, melalui Komite Dekolonisasi yang merupakan Badan Khusus yang dibentuk oleh PBB untuk menangani Daerah-daerah / wilayah yang sedang memperjuangkan Hak Penentuan Nasib Sendiri atau wilayah-wilayah yang sedang dijajah oleh bangsa lain. Pada jalur Hukum, melalui Mahkamah Internasional (International Court of Justice) ULMWP memperjuangkan Gugatan PEPERA 1969, yang mana rakyat Papua telah menyatakan bahwa PEPERA Cacat Hukum Internasional. Sedangkan khusus untuk jalur HAM juga diperjuangkan melalui Dewan HAM PBB dan Mahkamah Kriminal Internasional.
Konsekuensi dari jalur Politik dan Hukum adalah kembali kepada Resolusi 1514-1541 dan Piagam PBB bab XI tentang Hak Penentuan Nasib Sendiri / Pemberian Kemerdekaan kepada bangsa – bangsa yang dijajah (Dekolonisasi). Jalur Politik dan Jalur Hukum sangat berkaitan, di mana ketika Jalur Politik didorong, akan dipertimbangkan status Hukum dari wilayah West Papua secara Hukum Internasional. Apakah secara Hukum Internasional West Papua layak diberikan Hak Menentukan Nasib Sendiri? Apakah West Papua pernah terdaftar dalam daftar Komite Dekolonisasi? Adalah Pertanyaan Politik yang akan juga dipertimbangkan menurut Hukum Internasional? Secara Politik rakyat Papua menyatakan PEPERA tidak Demokratis, Penuh Manipulasi, Intimidasi dan Kekerasan. Pernyataan – Pernyataan Politik ini akan dibuktikan secara Hukum Internasional.
Berikut ini adalah ringkasan bersumber dari Makalah West Papua dan Hak Penentuan Nasib Sendiri dalam Hukum Internasional yang ditulis pada tahun 2010 oleh Melinda Janki, seorang pengacara publik berbasis di Inggris, yang juga memimpin asosiasi Pengacara Internasional untuk West Papua (ILWP). Diterjemahkan Oleh Viktor Yeimo dalam Bahasa Indonesia.
Makalah tersebut membahas tiga hal sebagai berikut: 1. Status hukum PEPERA dan menyimpulkan bahwa PEPERA merupakan PELANGGARAN hak penentuan nasib sendiri rakyat West Papua dalam hukum internasional. 2. Klaim teritorial Indonesia tidak menjustifikasi (membenarkan secara hukum) kedaulatan Indonesia atas West Papua. 3. Kehadiran Indonesia di West Papua adalah illegal, dan ilegalitas ini menjadi BASIS bagi KONFLIK berkepanjangan di West Papua. Oleh karena itu, klaim kedaulatan Indonesia atas West Papua, dan klaim West Papua atas hak penentuan nasib sendiri diatur (dan harus diselesaikan) oleh hukum internasional, bukan hukum domestik. Sehingga, harus diselenggarakan penentuan nasib sendiri yang sesuai dengan hukum internasional, hingga akhirnya menetapkan status internasional atas West Papua. I. PenentuanNasib Sendiri dalam Hukum Internasional a. Syarat penentuan nasib sendiri West Papua dalam hukum internasional b. West Papua sudah harus memiliki hak hukum substantif atas penentuan nasib sendiri di masa ketika Pepera 1969; dan, c. Pepera harus jelas terbukti melanggar persyaratan prosedural yang ditetapkan hukum internasional. Apa yang dimaksud hak hukum substantif West Papua? Hak hukum rakyat West Papua, sebagai rakyat koloni, untuk memilih status internasionalnya; yakni hak hukum West Papua atas penentuan nasib sendiri eksternal (internasional) dalam konteks dekolonisasi. Netherland New Guinea ditangani berdasarkan Piagam PBB Bagian XI yang meliputi teritori-teritori tak berpemerintahan sendiri seperti koloni-koloni. Landasan paling penting adalah lahirnya Deklarasi PBB No. 1514 (XV) tentang Penjaminan Kemerdekaan bagi Negeri-negeri dan Rakyat Koloni pada Desember 1960. Faktor-faktor lain yang menunjukkan bahwa Deklarasi memiliki signifikansi hukum, adalah: 1. Deklarasi disahkan tanpa suara penolakan dengan hanya sembilan suara abstain, dan suara abstain dapat dianggap persetujuan karena tidak ada penolakan nyata. 2. Deklarasi diikuti oleh beberapa resolusi yang merekomendasikan negara-negara mendukung pemerintahan sendiri, dan hak rakyat di teritori tak berpemerintahan sendiri untuk menentuan nasibnya sendiri, seperti Resolusi MU-PBB 9 (I), 421 (V), 545 (VI), 637 (VII), 83 7(IX), 1314 (XIII). 3. Untuk mempromosikan hak penentuan nasib sendiri, Majelis Umum menetapkan Komite Khusus Dekolonisasi: membuat rekomendasi-rekomendasi dan petunjuk atas kemajuan dan sejauh mana implementasi dari Deklarasi tersebut. (Resolusi 1654/XVI) 4. Deklarasi disebutkan 95 kali dalam sesi sidang Majelis Umum berikutnya. Setelah Deklarasi dibuat hingga akhir 1970, kekuasaan kolonial telah melepas otoritas mereka atas jutaan rakyat; dan 29 Negara-negara baru berdiri. Deklarasi ditetapkan oleh Dewan Keamanan dalam beberapa resolusinya, seperti Resolusi 183 (1963), 202 (1965), 217 (1965), 218 (1965), 301 (1971), 377 (1975). 5. Pengadilan Internasional menyatakan tegas bahwa “prinsip penentuan nasib sendiri adalah hak rakyat”; dan landasan bagi proses dekolonisasi. 6. Kebiasaan Majelis Umum sebagai sebuah badan, praktek negara-negara serta opini-opini Pengadilan menunjukkan bahwa penentuan nasib sendiri tahun 1960 telah berkembang. menjadi hak hukum yang dimiliki oleh rakyat teritori tak berpemerintahan sendiri dan Deklarasi adalah bukti aturan hukum baru internasional.
Argumentasi Indonesia bahwa West Papua tidak punya hak untuk menentukan nasib sendiri dengan mudah dapat dibantah oleh landasan berikut: 1. Kesepakatan New York 1962 dengan tegas memberikan hak penentuan nasib sendiri bagi West Papua, dan memberlakukan perjanjian kewajiban kepada Indonesia dalam Paragraf (d) Pasal XVIII untuk melakukan tindakan penentuan nasib sendiri “yang sesuai dengan praktek internasional.” Baik Belanda maupun Indonesia harus patuh pada keputusan West Papua. 2. Hasil dan dampak Kesepakatan New York (untuk menyelenggarakan penentuan nasib sendiri West Papua) menegasikan klaim Indonesia bahwa West Papua tidak punya hak penentuan nasib sendiri berdasarkan kebiasaan hukum internasional atau berdasarkan kewajiban perjanjian khusus Indonesia. Apa yang dimaksud persyaratan prosedural? 1. Persyaratan prosedural untuk penentuan nasib sendiri diatur oleh Majelis Umum melalui intepretasi Pasal 73 Piagam PBB. Pasal 73e menyatakan bahwa kekuasaan administrasi memiliki kewajiban untuk menyerahkan kepada Sekretaris Jenderal informasi statistik atau teknis lainnya terkait persyaratan sosial, ekonomi, pendidikan dalam teritori tak berpemerintahan sendiri. 2. Dalam kasus West Papua, pasal 73 menempatkan kewajiban kepada Belanda dari tahun 1945 dan kepada Indonesia tahun 1963, ketika Indonesia mengambil alih kekuasaan administratif. Sesuai Resolusi 567 (VI) Majelis Umum PBB, dua faktor (prinsip) yang dianggap penting bagi pemenuhan kewajiban itu adalah: kemajuan politik dan pendapat populasi. a. Kemajuan politik harus memadai agar membuat masyarakat mampu memutuskan masa depan nasib teritori mereka dengan pengetahuan yang dimiliki. b. Pendapat mereka harus dapat diekspresikan dengan bebas melalui proses yang informatif dan demokratis menyangkut perubahan status yang mereka kehendaki. Persyaratan ini disebutkan kembali dalam Resolusi Majelis Umum 648 (VII) dan 742 (VIII). Resolusi Majelis Umum 637 (VII) menegaskan bahwa kehendak masyarakat bersangkutan yang diekspresikan bebas harus ditentukan melalui plebisit atau cara-cara demokratis lainnya, khususnya dibawah dukungan PBB. Resolusi Majelis Umum 1541 (XV) menegaskan bahwa pasca 1960: Teritori tak berpemerintahan sendiri dapat dinyatakan memenuhi semua unsur pemerintahan sendiri ketika: 1. Berdiri sebagai sebuah negara berdaulat merdeka; 2. Asosiasi bebas dengan sebuah negara merdeka; atau 3. Integrasi dengan sebuah negara merdeka.
West Papua sebetulnya sudah dapat mencapai kemerdekaannya tanpa mesti mengikuti persyaratan prosedural, karena statusnya sebagai sebuah teritori tak berpemerintahan sendiri. Namun di tahun 1969, keputusan untuk mengintegrasikannya dengan Negara yang ada hanya sah jika hal itu memenuhi persyaratan Prinsip IX Resolusi Majelis Umum 1541 (XV). II. Kedaulatan Indonesia atas West Papua Tidak Sah (Ilegal) 1. Indonesia tidak mendapatkan kedaulatannya atas West Papua berdasarkan New York Agreement atau Piagam Pemindahan Kedaulatan. 2. PEPERA yang dilakukan 1969 yang terbukti tidak sah karena tidak memenuhi syarat-syarat prosedural sesuai prinsip-prinsip dan resolusi PBB terhadap wilayah tak berpemerintahan sendiri, juga tidak sah dijadikan klaim kedaulatan Indonesia atas West Papua, 3. Rakyat West Papua TIDAK DIMINTAI PENDAPAT di tahun 1962 ketika New York Agreement diputuskan, TIDAK DIMINTAI PENDAPAT ketika pilihan PEPERA 1969 ditetapkan, TIDAK DIMINTAI PENDAPAT terkait pilihan-pilihan apa yang harus ditetapkan sebelum pelaksanaan PEPERA. 4. Suara musyawarah 1022 orang (4 orang lainnya tidak ambil bagian), kurang dari 0,2% dari populasi Papua, yang dikondisikan setuju untuk integrasi dengan Indonesia, bukanlah suara yang sah untuk menyatakan integrasi yang benar. Oleh karena itu, pengambilalihan West Papua merupakan aneksasi illegal serupa dengan pengambilalihan sementara Indonesia atas Timor Leste di tahun 1975. Selain itu, juga tidak benar bahwa PBB melegitimasi/mengesahkan keputusan PEPERA. Buktinya adalah: 1. Pasal XXI New York Agreement meminta wakil PBB dan Indonesia melaporkan kepada Sekretaris Jenderal yang pada waktu itu diwajibkan memberi laporan itu ke Majelis Umum PBB terkait pelaksanaan dan hasil PEPERA. 2. General Konsil PBB menyarankan Sekjend PBB untuk mempresentasikan laporan seutuhnya kepada Majelis Umum dan bukan rangkuman laporan, karena: sah ataupun tidak, ada keraguan yang luas terkait apakah benar kesempatan seutuhnya diberikan terhadap ekspresi kehendak rakyat dalam kasus tersebut dan Sekjend oleh karena itu tidak boleh memberi kesan adanya bukti atau bahan yang dilewati atau disembunyikan. 3. Kedua laporan dijadikan lampiran pada laporan yang dipresentasikan Sekjend PBB di hadapan Majelis Umum. Resolusi 2504 (XVII) hanya menyatakan bahwa Majelis Umum: Mencatat laporan dari Sekretaris Jenderal dan mengakui dengan apresiasi pemenuhan tugas yang diberikan oleh Sekjend kepada wakil-wakilnya atas dasar New York Agreement 15 Agustus 1962 antara Republik Indonesia dengan Kerajaan Belanda terkait West New Guinea (Irian Barat). 4. Tugas yang diberikan pada wakil PBB terbatas pada memberi pandangan, mengawal, dan berpartisipasi dalam pengaturan PEPERA. Pengatur dan pelaksana sebenarnya adalah tanggung jawab Indonesia sesuai dengan New York Agreement. Wakil PBB tidak punya otoritas untuk setuju atau tidak setuju. PBB telah menjalankan tugasnya sekalipun, seperti dicatat oleh Sekjend PBB, Pemerintah Indonesia tidak selalu patuh pada saran yang diberikan. 5. Tugas Majelis Umum dibatasi oleh New York Agreement hanya untuk menerima laporan Sekjend PBB. Majelis Umum tidak punya otoritas untuk setuju maupun tidak setuju atas hasil PEPERA. Seperti yang dinyatakan oleh General Counsil PBB: Ini hal sulit, untuk bisa melihat tindakan apa yang dapat diambil Majelis Umum…. Persetujuan itu adalah antara Indonesia dan Belanda, dan PBB bukanlah pihak yang menjadi bagian di sana. 6. Resolusi 2504 (XVII) tidak menyebutkan penentuan nasib sendiri West Papua, atau West Papua tak lagi menjadi teritori tak berpemerintahan sendiri. Tak ada resolusi apapun lagi dari Majelis Umum PBB (atau Dewan Keamanan PBB) yang menyetujui PEPERA atau menegaskan bahwa West Papua telah menjalankan dengan bebas hak penentuan nasibnya sendiri. Tanpa adanya resolusi yang jelas menunjukkan persetujuan PBB atas PEPERA, maka sulit untuk menyimpulkan bahwa PBB telah memberi persetujuan atas integrasi West Papua ke Indonesia. Bahkan, lebih jauh lagi, keberadaan Indonesia di West Papua masih diragukan keabsahannya. Buktinya: 1. Hanya 0,2% populasi West Papua ambil bagian dalam PEPERA dan mereka tidak punya hak pilih; 2. West Papua berada dalam pendudukan militer; 3. Sejak awal di tahun 1963 ketika UNTEA memindahkan administrasi ke Indonesia, sudah sebanyak 15.000 pasukan keamanan Indonesia di West Papua; 4. Komite Dekolonisasi PBB bahkan menyatakan Netherland New Guinea bergabung dengan Indonesia di tahun 1963 sebagai Irian Jaya, yang artinya bahwa Indonesia bahkan sudah menganeksasi West Papua SEBELUM PEPERA. 5. Pengakuan dan persetujuan negara-negara juga diragukan sebagai landasan hukum atas kedaulatan Indonesia, karena ketika mengakui bahwa West Papua adalah teritori tak berpemerintahan sendiri, maka Indonesia terikat Pasal 73 Piagam PBB yang mewajibkannya: mengakui bahwa kepentingan penduduk teritori tersebut adalah utama, dan menerima sebagai suatu perwalian suci (sacred trust) kewajiban mempromosikan keselamatan para penduduk di teritori-teritori itu. Dan aneksasi Indonesia atas West Papua bukan sacred trust.
Status West Papua oleh karena itu merupakan koloni tak berpemerintahan sendiri yang berhak untuk penentuan nasib sendiri. Sampai West Papua dapat melaksanakan haknya untuk menentukan nasib sendiri maka ia masih menjadi sebuah koloni dan kehadiran Indonesia di West Papua ilegal.
Majelis Umum PBB telah mendeklarasikan: keberlanjutan kolonialisme dalam segala bentuk dan manifestasi adalah kejahatan yang melanggar Piagam PBB dan Deklarasi Jaminan Kemerdekaan terhadap Negeri-negeri dan Rakyat Terjajah serta prinsip-prinsip hukum internasional. (Resolusi 2621 (XXV). III. Kesimpulan 1) Di tahun 1949 setelah pembentukan Negara Republik Indonesia, West Papua adalah koloni tak berpemerintahan sendiri dan diakui demikian oleh PBB dan Belanda, yang pada waktu itu menjadi penguasa administratif kolonialnya. 2) Di tahun 1963 ketika Indonesia mengambil alih tanggung jawab administratif atas West Papua, teritori itu tetap berstatus koloni tak berpemerintahan sendiri yang berhak atas penentuan nasib sendiri dibawah hukum internasional. Hak itu diakui oleh Indonesia dalam New York Agreement yang menguatkan fakta bahwa Indonesia tidak memiliki kedaulatan hukum atas West Papua. 3) Keberadaan Indonesia di West Papua adalah administrasi kolonial yang bisa bersifat permanen hanya jika rakyat West Papua memilih integrasi melalui penentuan nasib sendiri dengan prosedur yang disyaratkan oleh hukum internasional. 4) Satu-satunya penentuan nasib sendiri yang dilakukan adalah PEPERA yang TIDAK SAH pada tahun 1969. Karena pengambilalihan tersebut tidak sah, maka West Papua bukanlah bagian sah dari teritori Indonesia namun teritori tak berpemerintahan sendiri dibawah pendudukan. 5) Kemerdekaan West Papua akan merupakan pengembalian kedaulatan rakyat Papua dan bukanlah pelanggaran integritas teritorial Indonesia. 6) Penggunaan kekuatan tentara bersenjata Indonesia di West Papua untuk membuat pasif rakyat West Papua merupakan wujud penyangkalan hak penentuan nasib sendiri dan kejahatan terhadap hukum internasional. 7) Negara-negara di dunia oleh karena itu perlu mengakui bahwa West Papua adalah koloni Indonesia dengan status yang berbeda dan terpisah, serta bertindak memastikan kejahatan hak azasi manusia di West Papua segera diakhiri. 8) Oleh karena itu, komunitas internasional negara-negara juga berkewajiban untuk memastikan bahwa rakyat Papua diberikan hak untuk secara bebas menentukan nasibnya sendiri.) 7) Jalur Politik dan Hukum yang ditempu oleh ULMWP melalui Komite Dekolonisasi (C-24) dan Mahkamah Internasional (ICJ) berlandaskan pada Piagam PBB XI dan Resolusi 1514. Sehingga dari kedua proses ini West Papua mendapatkan Status Daerah Dekolonisasi dan atau secara Hukum Memiliki Hak Untuk Menentukan Nasib Sendiri. Yang utama di sini bahwa Semua bangsa atau negara-negara anggota PBB mengakui Hak Politik bangsa Papua untuk menentukan Nasib Sendiri. 8) Tentang Prosedur atau mekanisme Hak Penentuan Nasib Sendiri, apakah melalui Plebisit / Referendum atau secara langsung wilayah administrasi – Pemerintahan Berdaulat diserahkan langsung kepada West Papua berdasarkan resolusi 1541. 9) Jika Proses Politik dan Hukum berjalan baik, kemungkinan Besar Indonesia akan menawarkan Perundingan dengan West Papua. Atau negara-negara anggota PBB dapat mendesak Indonesia untuk mengadakan Perundingan dengan West Papua. Kita berharap perundingan terjadi di bawah pengawasan Internasional / di forum PBB. Agenda perundingan yang penting bagi kita adalah Pengembalian Administrasi West Papua tanpa adanya Perwalihan Internasional (Contoh UNTEA Dahulu) / (atau dalam bahasa lain, pemulihan Kedaulatan West Papua).
Penulis adalah Alumnus STFT Fajar Timur Abepura-Papua Editor: Erick Bitdana
Planet Bumi merupakan tempat kehidupan seluruh Komunitas Makhluk, dalam tanda kutip (tidak hanya makhluk manusia) — Bumi dihuni oleh berbagai Makhluk. Ada hewan, tumbuh-tumbuhan, makhluk roh, bentangan alam dan benda-benda lain.
Kegiatan-kegiatan industri ekstraktif seperti pertambangan minyak, gas dan mineral, penebangan pohon, perkebunan kelapa sawit dan kegiatan lainnya menyebabkan terjadinya perubahan iklim (global warming) sangat cepat yang berdampak pada punahnya kehidupan di planet bumi.
(Makhluk Manusia) menjadi “aktor utama” penyebab pemusnahan ini. Kuasa yang diberikan Tuhan kepada makhluk Manusia disalahgunakan hingga batas tak terkontrol yang mendatangkan malapetaka besar bagi seluruh kehidupan — Betapa jahatnya Manusia yang menjadi aktor utama yang mendatangkan (neraka abadi bagi seluruh kehidupan).
Perlahan makhluk Manusia telah mengetahui, bahwa telah salah besar terhadap seluruh kehidupan di planet bumi. Terutama, manusia telah salah besar terhadap Tuhan (Sang Pencipta/pemberi kuasa/mandat) —
Manusia mulai bingung sana-sini mencari “tempat tinggal cadangan” hingga ada yang lari ke Planet Mars, ada juga yang merancang Negara di luar angkasa sebagai tempat pelarian dari masalah.
Kehadiran (adanya) negara-negara merdeka di seluruh dunia, termasuk (terutama) Indonesia telah menjadi masalah besar bagi masa depan planet bumi (…)
dengan demikian,
“Apakah…. dengan ‘akan adanya’ kehadiran Kemerdekaan Negara Republik West Papua pun turut menjadi negara Merdeka ke Sekian yang yang membawa/menambah masalah baru? atau sebaliknya kemerdekaan West Papua dapat membawa “solusi bagi masalah yang ada” — ini adalah tanggung jawab kita bersama termasuk seluruh dunia. _____ West Papua merupakan paru-paru bagi dunia (organ pernapasan bagi planet bumi) — oleh karenanya, kemerdekaan West Papua akan sangat menentukan arah (menjadi kompas) masa depan kehidupan bumi.
Intinya adalah: “semua makhluk penghuni planet Bumi” membutuhkan “Kehidupan” — untuk itu, tindakan mendesak (urgent) yang harus dilakukan adalah menyelamatkan planet bumi yang adalah tempat hidup seluruh makhluk.
West Papua melalui United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) pada 2020 kemarin telah mengadopsi Undang-Undang Dasar (UUDS) dan Pemerintah Sementara dengan Visi-nya menjadi: NEGARA HIJAU PERTAMA DI DUNIA atau GREEN STATE.
Diadopsinya UUDS Provisional Government of West Papua mencakup semua bidang, terutama yang menjadi prioritas Pemerintah Sementara adalah mendatangkan Keselamatan dan Kehidupan abadi bagi seluruh Komunitas Makhluk khususnya di West Papua dan secara menyeluruh adalah kehidupan bagi planet bumi —
Kemerdekaan West Papua tidak hanya menjadi kemerdekaan bagi bangsa Melanesia di West Papua, tetapi lebih dari itu adalah kemerdekaan bagi seluruh kehidupan di planet bumi, dimana Pemerintah Sementara West Papua (ULMWP) hadir dengan Visi-nya “Green State” (…) ______ West Papua sudah siap! ★ Kami sudah punya Undang-Undang Dasar dan Pemerintah Sementara (Provisional Government of West Papua | ULMWP) ★ Kami sudah punya Presiden dan Perdana Menteri; ★ Kami sudah punya 12 Kabinet Menteri yang mencakup semua bidang; ★ Kami sudah punya Kedutaan Besar (Kedubes) di seluruh dunia; ★ Kami sudah punya pagar negara Pemerintah Sementara, yakni “West Papua Army” dengan Panglima Komandannya Chief. Gen. Mathias Wenda dan Wakil Panglimanya Gen. Goliath Tabuni berserta lima (5) kepala staf; ★ Kami sudah punya Kepolisian West Papua (West Papua Police) sebagai penegak hukum Pemerintah Sementara; ★ Kami sudah punya Visi dan Misi perjuangan kemerdekaan West Papua yang jelas (tidak sporadis seperti yang di-cap kolonial Indonesia);
Kami sudah siap! West Papua siap bernegara, dengan Visi-nya “Green State” — kemerdekaan West Papua adalah keselamatan bumi.
The Japanese occupation (1942–1945) had a predominantly divisive effect on Indonesia, although there were certain counteracting unifying elements. The Japanese brutally subjugated the Indonesian people, disrupted trade and communications among them through strict censorship and attempts to make each regency self-sufficient, and encouraged division among the national leaders. The actions of the Japanese evoked an allied blockade that further isolated the different parts of the archipelago.
From being welcomed enthusiastically as liberators from hated colonial rule on their arrival in 1942, the Japanese took barely four weeks to alienate almost the entire population. Instead of liberating and “restoring the independence of Asian peoples,” as their propaganda claimed, they were more repressive than the Dutch had been even at the height of their anti-nationalist campaign. All nationalist movements were suppressed, political assemblies and demonstrations forbidden, display of the Indonesian flag prohibited, and any discussion, speculation, or propaganda regarding the political organization or administration of the country outlawed.
Punishment was ruthless. Further aspects of Japanese rule that particularly offended the Indonesians included the degrading punishment of flogging; Japanese emperor worship, which obliged the population to perform the ceremonial bow (saikerei) in the direction of the imperial palace in Tokyo (which deeply upset Muslims, whose prayerful bow was toward Mecca in the opposite direction); and the shaving of students’ heads.
But both in the intensity of their actions and in the duration of their presence, the Japanese occupation was uneven. As with the Dutch before them, the Japanese focused their attention on Java (and particularly on Jakarta), exploiting both its raw materials and labor resources. In their administrative organization of the country, the Japanese divided Indonesia into three separate commands, with little interaction among them: Java and Madura were under the Sixteenth Army based in Jakarta; Sumatra was administered from Singapore by the Twenty-fifth Army; and eastern Indonesia was controlled by the Navy, whose second fleet was headquartered in Makassar (southern Celebes).
The entrenched rivalry between the Japanese army and navy was also transferred to Indonesia. The army was more brutal and ruthless in its methods than the navy, although it gave considerable latitude for the Indonesian nationalist movement to develop (allowing, for example, the long-exiled nationalist leaders substantial freedom of movement and contact with the Indonesian masses). The navy, though less brutal, followed a severely repressive policy, discouraging any kind of indigenous political organization. The divisiveness of the Japanese impact thus reinforced differences between the western and eastern parts of the country. In terms of the length of Japanese in- fluence, although most of the country experienced a full three and one-half years of occupation, some of the eastern islands were liberated and reoccupied by allied forces more than a year before the rest of the country.
Yet the Japanese occupation was not without its unifying elements. The brutal treatment inflicted by the Japanese provoked deep and bitter opposition and caused common suffering that afterwards at least was recognized as a shared experience.
Almost all parts of the country had their economies and ways of life disrupted, although not everywhere to the same extent. A shortage of labor, caused by conscription, resulted in neglect of estate production and irrigation works and a consequent decrease in food production; hardship and suffering thereby increased. On the more positive side, the efficient Japanese administrative and communications networks reached down to almost every village and increased contact among the ordinary people. The Japanese organized neighborhood associations (tonarigumi), the concept of which still survives today in the rukun tetangga.
Similarly, the Japanese ordered the Indonesians to establish kumiai in every tonari gumi and village, a form of cooperative society imposed from above that survived in modified form in the koperasi (cooperatives) of the later Guided Democracy period. In some ways Japanese policy also consolidated nationalist feeling by creating an all-embracing Muslim organization, the Masjumi (Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia), comprising the Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama, and other groups. This was intended to provide more effective control of Muslim feeling, but in practical terms it laid the foundation for united Muslim political activity, which was to carry over into the early years of independence.
The Japanese propaganda system was used in disguise by the nationalists to raise villagers’ political consciousness. In addition, although requiring all Indonesians to learn the Japanese language (and prohibiting the use of Dutch), the Japanese were forced in the interim to rely on the national language, bahasa Indonesia, to disseminate their propaganda: by so doing they unwittingly promoted and spread knowledge of Indonesian. Further, expediency obliged the Japanese to push through a virtual social revolution as they mobilized the population and pressed everyone into their service—Muslim leaders, nationalists, princely families, and common people—without regard for their local particularisms or traditional social barriers.
They promoted Indonesians to many of the administrative and technical positions previously held by the Dutch. This increased opportunities for upward socioeconomic mobility among the nationalist elite, Muslim leaders, and even the old nobility and undermined the stability of society (as well as one of the most important sources of support for the Dutch regime). Old values were questioned and former social relationships were inverted and destroyed; the Japanese lost no opportunity to humiliate the former colonial masters in the eyes of the Indonesians. This inspired a new and powerful sense of self-reliance and authority among Indonesians, who found themselves both capable and competent to perform duties previously regarded as beyond their ability by the Dutch.
It also developed a determination among them to preserve what had already been gained. The Japanese also set up, in 1943, what the Dutch had always resisted, an auxiliary, volunteer army, Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air (Peta), which was composed mainly of members of Muslim organizations. This numbered some 120,000 men by 1945. It was this Japanese-trained but Indonesian-officered military that was to provide the principal military force behind the revolution, both in its early stages, when ironically it turned on Japanese forces and fought them, and later, when it fought the British and subsequently Dutch forces. In addition, the Japanese gave very limited military training (but no arms) and the function of security guards to a considerable number of village and urban youth; when the Peta later expanded its ranks as a revolutionary army, it was able to draw on this source.
On the Indonesian side, although opposition to the Japanese occupation intensified, there was no unanimity on how to respond. Some nationalist leaders, like Sukarno and Hatta, ostensibly collaborated with the Japanese while surreptitiously using the opportunities afforded them to rally support for nationalist ideas. Other leaders, like Sjahrir, organized underground re- sistance. Even the organizations established by the Japanese divided Indonesian opinion. At first many nationalist leaders thought they could achieve their goals by working through Japanese-approved institutions, such as the commission to study Indonesian customary law (adat), the Empat Serangkai (literally Four-leaved Clover, referring to the four Indonesian leaders: Sukarno, Hatta, Mansur, and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro), the Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Center of People’s Power, Putera), and the TjuoSangi-In (Central Advisory Committee). Unlike the Volksraad (People’s Council), where the majority had never actively supported the nationalists’ goal of independence, the Tjuo Sangi-Inconsisted exclusively, apart from the ubiquitous Japanese observers, of deputies who were of one mind in desiring independence.
But the perceived cooperation of nationalist leaders with the hated Japanese was itself divisive, as most of the Muslim groups and many regional leaders regarded them astraitors and accomplices in increasing the suffering of the Indonesian people.
The Japanese attitude toward the nationalist leaders was not consistent. Having tried at first to mobilize the population for the war effort without the help of acknowledged Indonesian leaders, the Japanese soon realized that the only way to get their economic program carried out was by using established leaders. They thus incorporated nationalist leaders in the Putera, which had a central bureau in Jakarta (the Japanese had adopted the native name for Batavia since the end of 1942) and branches in most provinces, and in the Tjuo Sangi-In, set up in Jakarta in 1943 with similar bodies (sangi-kai) in the provinces.
Later, the Japanese replaced the Putera with the Jawa Hokokai (Javanese People’s Loyalty Movement) to mobilize and control better the priyayi (gentry), particularly the lesser priyayi or, as they were now more often called, the pamong praja (adminis- trative corps).
The Indonesian nationalists, although retaining key positions in the new movement, were incensed by the creation of Jawa Hokokai, partly because it deprived them of the organizational independence they had enjoyed in the time of the Putera, partly because this Japanese-titled organization reflected only too clearly the occupiers’ policy of Nipponization, and partly because they were sandwiched between the military and the priyayi, neither of whom were interested in encouraging ideas of independence among the masses.
Furthermore, the Japanese were not consistent in their attitude toward independence for Indonesia. At first they held out the possibility of independence (1942), but quickly changed this to membership in a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (March 1943), then incorporation into the Japanese empire (May 1943), followed by permission to “cooperate in government” (June 1943), and finally, after growing Nipponization, a deceptive promise of independence (September 1944). Yet despite the disappointment and frustration of gradual annexation and Nipponization, and despite the denial of future independence, nationalist sentiment grew and the nationalist leaders, particularly in Java, never lost their fervor nor stopped putting pressure on the occupation regime for self-government and in-dependence. As Hatta put it in 1943:
It was perhaps necessary for strategic reasons to divide Indonesia into separate areas of military administration, but Indonesians will not give up the desire and determination they have shown over the past forty years to unite these territories into one glo- rious nation.
Thus, tremendous changes took place during the brief three and one-half years of Japanese occupation, out of all proportion to the pace of developments earlier in the century. Not only was political consciousness raised on a wide scale, but also, especially toward the end of the occupation, plans were made and organizations created to prepare for forthcoming independence. Although the first nationalist organizations under the Japanese were limited to the Java-Madura command only, they were not restricted to those living only on Java. There were many active nationalist leaders from different ethnic groups throughout the archipelago. Although nationalism was strongest in Java and most of the organized movements and resistance to the Japanese took place there, nationalism had developed a pan-Indonesian appeal. There were frequent rebellions against Japanese rule in the Outer Islands that were often hard to suppress. Although people from Java predominated in the councils and organizations that pressed for a share in gov- ernment, the Outer Islands had similar advisory committees and provincial municipal councils, beginning in 1944.
Sumatra, for example, had a single council set up in March 1945 at Bukit Tinggi consisting of Acehnese and representatives of western, eastern, and southern Sumatra.
It was not until May 1945, however, that a nationwide committee was established to deal with the problems of independence (and not until August that Indonesian nationalists from the navy-administered areas were permitted to come to Java to consult with Javanese and Sumatran leaders).
This was the Badan Penyelidikan Kemerdekaan Indone sia (the BPKI, the Committee for the Investigation of Independence for Indonesia), which consisted of sixty-three nominated members from all classes of the population and all shades of opinion in the nationalist movement, and included Outer Islanders living in Java. Nationalists, federalists, unitarians—all had different ideas about the size, shape, partitioning, and administering of the new country-to-be.
It was at the first session of the BPKI that Sukarno proposed the Panca Sila (Five Principles of State) as the basic ideology of the future state: belief in one God, nationalism, humanitarianism, social justice, and popular sovereignty. It is probable that this national philosophy, with its fusion of ideologies in keeping with the ancient Javanese tradition of syncretism, met with acceptance only because of the strength of outside pressures—the approaching end of the Japanese occupation and the possibility of independence. It papered over deeply rooted differences rather than resolvingthem. The BPKI adopted a republican form of government and drafted a constitution based in theory on the Indonesian democratic principles of consultation (musyawarah), consensus (mufakat), and cooperation (gotong royong). Sovereignty was to reside in the Majelis Rakyat Indonesia (the Indonesian People’s Congress), which was to consist of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR, a parliament chosen by direct vote) together with additional deputies who were to represent provinces and groups in proportion to their population and size. The Congress was to elect a president and vice-president by simple majority for a five-year term and a Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (Advisory Council of State). Ironically, however, the whole constitution reflected more the authoritarian principles of Dutch and Japanese rule that had been so violently criticized than the more flexible consultation and consensus processes regarded as more “Indonesian.”
Considerable disagreement arose over the precise shape of the future independent state. Hatta wanted to limit Indonesia to the former Dutch East Indies but without New Guinea, though possibly including Malaya. Yamin, supported by Sukarno, demanded the whole of New Guinea, Portuguese Timor, the British possessions in Borneo, and Malaya as far as the frontier with Thailand. A third group, consisting mostly of former civil servants, wanted the territory of the Dutch East Indies precisely as it stood. Interestingly, in the voting Yamin’s Greater Indonesia won an overwhelming majority, illustrating again how unsolidified the concept of Indonesia still was in 1945. It was not untillater that year, when the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee was constituted, with eight of its twenty representatives coming from the Outer Islands, that the decision was made to confine the new independent country to the territory of the former Dutch East Indies.
Independence was declared on August 17, 1945. In Jakarta, the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP, the Central Indonesian National Committee) was set up, with 135 members chosen by Sukarno and Hatta to represent the chief ethnic, religious, social, and economic groups in Indonesia; while in the eight provinces established by the Preparatory Committee (West, Central, and East Java; Sumatra; Kalimantan; Sulawesi; Maluku; and the Lesser Sunda Islands) arrangements were made for local national committees. A governor was ap-pointed for each province by Sukarno; the KNIP appointed a delegate to assist each governor. Thus in the six weeks between the Japanese surrender and the Allied arrival, the Indonesians had established a fledgling republican government with its own civil service and with extensive militant support among the Indonesian people. The Indonesian flag was flown, the black cap or peci (originally a Muslim symbol but extended by Sukarno to have national significance) was worn, and Radio Republik Indonesia went on the air. The nationalists, led by the Peta (Indonesian army) and students, first struggled for control of Japanese weapons and for key cities in both Java and Sumatra and then wrestled with the British occupational forces. Only after this did they begin their major conflict, with the returning Dutch, who were unable to comprehend either the extent or depth of nationalist feeling that had so intensified in their brief four-year absence.
The next four years of struggle against the Dutch, from 1945 to 1949, were a time of growing solidarity and psychological unity for many Indonesians in their demand for a united and fully independent Indonesia. Differences of opinion inevitably arose that temporarily distracted the people and created divisive tensions, such as that between the youth and the older leaders both inside and outside the army, and by the communists (who attempted to lead a revolt against Sukarno and Hatta in Madiun in 1948), but the momentum of the nationalist movement and resistance both to the Dutch “Pacification Ex-ercises” and to the imprisonment of Indonesian leaders strengthened national resistance and provided a strong integrative force.
Yet, as with nationalist consciousness, revolutionary fervorwas by no means uniformly felt throughout the country. Support for the newly independent Republic centered in central and eastern Java, Jakarta, and parts of Sumatra. By contrast, there was no strong or active Indonesian nationalist organization in eastern Indonesia, where the Japanese had not permitted Indonesian nationalists to organize or to form militias. Much ofthis area was occupied up to a year before the Japanese sur- render by the Allied forces (Australian) and was returned easily to Dutch civil administration after the war. Most of Java and Sumatra, by contrast, remained part of the revolutionary Republic. The Ambonese continued to support the Dutch and even fought against their fellow countrymen’s revolutionary struggle for independence. Inevitably by so doing, they aroused bitter resentment. Indeed, so strong was their anti-Republic sentiment that after the Round Table Conference in 1949, southern Maluku withstood considerable pressure to merge with the Republic of Indonesia in a unitary state as the other “federal states” did. It preferred instead to transfer its leaders (and 40,000 of its population who were mainly former members of the Dutch colonial army [KNIL] and their families, and former officials in the Dutch administration) to the Netherlands and form a government-in-exile there, waiting for the opportunity to reestablish an independent entity in those islands.
Anti-Republic sentiment was also expressed by the Darul Islam movement focused in West Java, Aceh, and later in South Sulawesi and Kalimantan. This aimed at establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia and as such opposed both the Republic and Dutch domination. It supported its claim with guerrilla warfare, which lasted from 1950 to 1962. Part of the Dutch strategy to regain control of the archipelago was to accentuate differences among Indonesians in different parts of the country. They attempted to isolate the self-proclaimed Republic from other areas of Indonesia in the hope of creating a federal order wherein pro-Republican elements would be outnumbered by Dutch-controlled component states.
The other part of Dutch strategy was to destroy the Republic by military means. They abrogated a number of agreements (including the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements) made with the Republic over the 1946–1949 period and ultimately forced on the revolutionary Republic’s leaders a federal state in which fifteen of the sixteen member states were of Dutch creation. Each of these was far smaller in size and significance than the Republic, which by 1949 comprised approximately half of Java and three-quarters of Sumatra (and a population of more than thirty-one million). Among Indonesia’s leaders there remained wide differences of opinion as to the future form and orientation of the country.
Pro-Dutch, pro-Islamic state, and pro-Panca Sila (revolutionary Republic) nationalist sentiments existed in different parts of the archipelago. The experiences of the isolation of different areas under the Japanese and the four years of revolution against the Dutch during which the separate regions acted as highly autonomous units further hindered the growth of unity.
However, counterbalancing these centrifugal forces were the psychological unity created by the goal of a united and fully independent Indonesia, an increasing sense of national identity, the consciousness of a common political purpose, and the commitment to a common revolutionary struggle against the Dutch. Yet in these strong centripetal forces and psychological bonds of unity lay the seeds of weakness. For once independence had been fully attained, the powerful negative dynamic of opposition to colonial rule was no longer applicable, and Indonesian nationalism lost much of its strength as a force for national cohesion. In the absence of strong outside pressures, ethnic and regional differences that had been submerged to some extent in the common struggle for independence soon reappeared to challenge the concept of national unity. Indeed, it has been claimed that the very success of the Indonesian revolution against the Dutch not only strengthened national political consciousness, but above all awakened regional pride based on ancient ethnic particularisms.
Also, belief that independence would be a panacea for all difficulties, economic, social, and political, turned quickly to disillusionment as expectations for a better life remained largely unfulfilled (and the standard of living in Java continued to decline). In addition, appreciation of the centripetal power createdby opposition to a common enemy contributed to the adoption of adventuristic policies in the new Republic, such as the continued cries to perpetuate the revolution (“against the enemies of imperialism, capitalism, liberalism, and individualism” ),the growing confrontation with the Dutch over the status of West Irian, and the Konfrontasi with Malaysia of the early and mid-1960s.
Prime Minister James Marape has called on Papua New Guineans to make use of tomorrow’s national day of Prayer and Repentance for its intended purpose.
Mr. Marape, says the significance of this very important day must not be downplayed and used like any other day of rest or public holiday.
He adds that it is an opportune time for the country and people to go to God in prayer and forgiveness and also forgive each other.
For the first time in 10 years, the official program for the National Day of Prayer and Repentance will be held outside Port Moresby.
It’s a public holiday in Papua New Guinea tomorrow, with the day marked by prayer ceremonies across the country, while the official program has always been held in the nation’s capital.
The Government has decided to have the official program in the Morobe capital Lae, at the Sir Ignatius Stadium.
Prime Minister James Marape will be represented by the Minister for Public Service Joe Sungi and the Minister for Community Development Wake Goi will be among dignitaries.
NBC Radio will carry live the program throughout the country.
Mogul bisnis dan kemanusiaan Ghana, Freedom Jacob Caesar, telah ditunjuk sebagai Duta Besar Afrika Barat untuk United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP). Freedom Jacob Caesar akan membantu perjuangan West Papua untuk merdeka dari Indonesia di bawah satu payung organisasi melalui dukungan diplomatik, keuangan, kemanusiaan, dan politik.
Ini terjadi setelah industrialis dan filantropis Ghana berdiri dan menuntut jawaban Pemerintah Cina atas cara orang kulit hitam, termasuk orang Ghana, diperlakukan di puncak pandemi yang berlaku.
Serangan dari Pemerintah Indonesia Freedom Jacob Caesar akan membantu dalam perjuangan pembebasan penduduk asli kulit hitam di Papua Barat yang telah diserang sejak tahun 1962 dari Pemerintah Indonesia untuk mengekstraksi sumber daya dan menguasai tanah, sebuah video di halaman Instagram-nya mengatakan. Video lebih lanjut mengungkapkan bahwa kelompok hak asasi manusia memperkirakan lebih dari 500.000 warga sipil West Papua telah dibunuh selama beberapa dekade terakhir.
Upaya kemanusiaan Bediako “Osagyefo”’ Freedom Upaya kemanusiaan Jacob Caesar Bediako dan kepedulian terhadap hak asasi manusia global menyebabkan pengangkatannya untuk membantu dalam perjuangan pembebasan rakyat.
United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) merupakan penyatuan tiga gerakan kemerdekaan politik utama yang mencari kemerdekaan untuk West Papua dari Indonesia.
ULMWP dibentuk pada 7 Desember 2014, di Vanuatu yang menyatukan Negara Republik Federal Papua Barat (NRFPB), West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL), dan Parlemen Nasional West Papua (PNWP). Tonton videonya Jacob Caesar di bawah ini —Video: (https://www.instagram.com/tv/CSzlEuxA5Lo) ____Sumber berita, Yen(dot)com.gh:(https://yen.com.gh/192612-freedom-jacob-caesar-appointed-west-african-ambassador-ulmwp-video-emerges.html)____YEN.com.gh adalah publikasi berita online Ghana yang dibuat pada September 2015. Ini mencakup berita lokal dan internasional. #Solidatity #Ghana #RACISME #Indonesia #BlackLivesMatter #UnitedStatesofrica #PapuanLivesMatter #WestPapua #FreeWestPapua
Prime Minister Hon. James Marape says a sovereign wealth fund (SWF)will be set up as the Government, for the first time ever, has a clear policy on payment of dividends from resource projects. He announced this major breakthrough today when receiving a K100 million dividend payment from Kumul Petrolum Holdings Ltd (KPHL).
PM Marape, when receiving the money from KPHL Board Chairman Prof Benedict Yaru and Managing-Director Wapu Sonk, said he expected the company to pay another K200 million to meet the full dividend of K300 million as budgeted in the 2021 National Budget.
The SWF has been talked about for many years, however, has never been established despite billions of kina the country has earned from its natural resources like mining, oil and gas. “Since our Government took office, for the first time, we have a clear dividend policy,” PM Marape said at the Parliament State Function Room. “This has not been in place for many years.”
PM Marape said KPHL, like many State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), was now subject to an annual work plan which came under directions from its Board and Government. He said under the dividend payment policy for SOEs now in place:
60 per cent of all revenue was to be channeled back to the State;
10 per cent to community-based projects;
7 per cent to an SWF;
13 per cent to the SOE concerned; and
10 per cent for administration costs. “In as far as our country is concerned, the law has created that facility (SWF), however, no government in the past has seriously thought of putting money into a sovereign wealth fund,” PM Marape said. “I can understand why, when we don’t have much money, but our Government has now decided to differ, with 7 per cent of all revenue from resource projects to be put into a sovereign wealth fund. “We intend to start to utilise this facility (SWF) this year and going forward. “This will instill a savings culture in our Government for tomorrow.”
The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris as it applies to post – colonial conflicts is called into question this week after the International Court of Justice handed down the Chagos Archipelago Advisory Opinion. http://dailypost.vu/…/article_b7c91ff6-2cdc-5df6-9b89…
Indonesia for decades since the 1960s considered the boundaries drawn up by colonial masters provided by international law, and pushed the international law principle of Uti Possidetis Juris to justify its claim to sovereignty over West Papua.
This was a period in which Indonesian embassies have been able to keep governments around the world insulated from the story of Papua. There was a problem. West Papua was ‘ the pebble in Jakarta’s shoes’, and Indonesian embassies were peddling historical inaccuracies and covering up human rights abuses that are happening in West Papua.
The strong point for Indonesia was the principle of Uti Possidetis Juris (“as you possess”) which formed the basis for Indonesian sovereignty in West Papua. In international law, the principle is applied to cases where states inherit and retain the boundaries drawn up by their colonial masters.
Uti Possidetis Juris is also taken to “signify that the parties to a treaty are to retain possession of what they have acquired by force during the war. This seemed to be the case in the Chagos Island International Court of Justice ruling or advisory opinion handed down this week which puts Britain and US on notice as to what the international best – practice is. They both preach it to the world. Of course, these democratic principles are accorded to all civilized nations in the 21st century including self – determination particularly given the colonial context. https://www.theguardian.com/…/un-court-rejects-uk-claim…
There were a number of wrong assumptions with the Indonesian signature illegal claim to sovereignty over West Papua based on the Uti Possidetis Juris principle of international law. Firstly, Indonesian colonial history differed with the rest of the East Indies colony under Dutch rule. The fact is West Papua was never part of the Dutch East Indies that was created by the Netherlands in the 17th century. The Dutch had control mainly over the two Muslim and one Hindu Empires that existed in the area now comprising the Republic of Indonesia.
West Papua became a colony of the Netherlands 200 years later in the 19th century as Dutch New Guinea. West Papua therefore did not have a shared colonial history with the entity now called the Republic of Indonesia.
Secondly, the Indonesian declaration of independence in 1949 did not include West Papua after fighting its war of liberation against the Netherlands. The Indonesian Republic and its decolonization experience evolved separately from West Papua’s decolonization thesis because it was a separate colonial possession and was being prepared by the Netherlands for its political future and independence in the early 1960s.
For instance, at the time Indonesia invaded West Papua in 1962, West Papua had a Constituent Assembly, a coat of arms, national anthem and all the character of a nation awaiting independence. It means the principle of Uti Possidetis Juris does not form a basis for Indonesian claims over West Papua. Instead, West Papua is an annexed territory and one that has been occupied ever since the 1962 invasion by the Indonesian military.
Thirdly, UN Resolution No. 2504/1969 does not constitute an agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian) that was embedded in the Act of Free Choice of 1969 so as to cater for a referendum exercise. And, where West Papuans as a people could freely exercise their rights to self-determination.
The history of the fraud of West Papua is now well – documented. United Nations Secretary General gave free reign to the Indonesians to conduct the Act of Free Choice, but by all accounts the Act of Free Choice was never a referendum.
For instance, only 1026 Melanesians from a population of about 1.2 million people were selected by the occupying Indonesian military to decide the fate of the whole of the West Papuan to either be integrated into the Republic of Indonesia or become an independent sovereign state.
And, the evidence of a UN – sponsored referendum that did not meet any standard or requirement of international law on the right to self-determination, as it existed then, and as it exists now, has come to light. If only 1026 Papuans took part then the voting was not free and fair. Besides, there was intimidation by the Indonesian military for Papuans to cast their votes in favor of integration into the existing Indonesian Republic. An Indonesian army officer, with a gun pointed to the heads of the Papuan leaders warned: “You have to choose Indonesia not Papua. If you don’t choose Indonesia, then I will kill you, all of you”. The result of the referendum was an overwhelming “in favor” vote to be integrated into the Indonesian Republic.
In the aftermath of the events of this week, Indonesia has been under a lot of pressure to exploit its last options. One of them is to tell the world the truth – and say sorry!
The Chagos Islands ruling or advisory opinion by International Court of Justice puts into perspective the 1969 “Act of Free Choice” given the clear evidence available today that it was a sham and a total disregard of the democratic principles that is accorded to all civilized nations.
The democratic principles accorded to all civilized nations includes the West Papua issue having the benefit of being progressed, and escalated, towards debate by the UN General Assembly for resolution based on international intervention by MSG and PIF, as well non – state actors like the World Council of Churches.
In recent months, internationalization of the West Papua issue has paid dividends.
Vanuatu officials had a scheduled meeting in Geneva with U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet. Among them was an exiled Papuan leader, and West Papuan pro – independence umbrella group ULMWP chief Benny Wenda, who presented a voluminous petition signed by about 2 million indigenous Papuans to Bachelet.
(Photo Caption: Mauritius Oral Submission team – ICJ; Vanuatu legal team was on the panel represented by Jennifer Robinson; Chagos Island; Chagos Islanders demand their homeland to be returned; ULMWP petition – called for independence referendum for West Papua is before the UNHRC; ULMWP Chairman Benny Wenda – petition signed by up to 2 million indigenous Papuans was a civilized process to involve the UN in the West Papua issue)
Government of West Papua 